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On any list of the most controversial sectors of
the U.S. economy, surely futures markets, finan-
cial markets, and the housing market would ap-
pear near the top. The housing sector has been
the intended beneficiary ofa wide variety ofpub-
lic programs. Financial markets have long been
subjected to a myriad ofgovernment regulations.
And futures markets have had to fight repeated
attempts to legislate them out of existence.
The Chicago Board of Trade established a
unique link among these three sectors in October
1975 when it inaugurated a futures market in the
financial instruments of the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA). This
agency had designed its "pass-through" certifi-
cates-mortgage-backed bonds guaranteed by
GNMA-in order to help the housing industry
by attracting more investors to the mortgage
market. Most economists would argue that the
institution of futures trading in GN MA certifi-
cates should further that goal. Economic theory
suggests that futures trading arises in markets
characterized by large price variability and that
it helps to reduce that variability.1 By contrast,
many non-economists believe that futures trad-
ing is a cause of greater price variability rather
than a response to that variability. Business
Week referred recently to "... the charge that
futures markets themselves increase the volatil-
ity of commodity prices and that speculators are
the chiefculprits behind wild swings, often push-
ing prices in directions that are unwarranted by
underlying economic conditions."2
If the establishment of a GNMA futures mar-
ket increases the variability of GNMA spot
prices, a number of investors might find GNMA
certificates less attractive. Futures trading in
GNMA's would then be at odds with the goal of
increasing the liquidity of the mortgage mar-
'Economist, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco. The au-
thor wishes to thank Ladan Amir-Aslani for her assistance
with this study. Data were kindly provided by the Chicago
Board ofTrade and the First Boston Corporation, neither of
which necessarily concurs with the views presented here.
20
ket-a market in which GNMA securities are
playing an increasingly important role. At the
end of 1977, GN MA-back securities accounted
for almost $44 billion of the $650 billion out-
standing debt on one-to-four-family homes.3
There have already been charges that the "ex-
plosive growth" ofthe GN MA market has led to
speculative excesses.4 Presumably, the growth of
a futures market will encourage even more spec-
ulative activity in this market. The purpose of
this article is to determine whether futures trad-
ing in GNMA certificates has stabilized or de-
stabilized GNMA spot prices. This question is
important to policymakers charged with aiding
the housing market as well as to those responsible
for regulating futures trading. Furthermore, the
question has implications for the other financial
futures markets now in existence: Treasury bills,
Treasury bonds, and commercial paper. The
Wall Street Journal has noted government offi-
cials' concern that speculative activity in finan-
cial futures could disrupt the bond market.5
Consequently, should the development of these
futures markets be encouraged or discouraged?
As in the case ofthe GNMA's, the answer partly
depends on the extent to which futures trading
affects spot prices.
A related and equally important policy issue is
whether banks and thrift institutions should hold
financial futures only for use in hedging activi-
ties. However, this article will not attempt to ad-
dress that question.
Section I discusses the motivations which led to
the development of the GNMA futures market.
Section II examines the theoretical basis for the
belief that speculation will tend to stabilize rath-
er than destabilize prices. Section III presents
the results ofalternative empirical tests ofthe ef-
fect of GN MA futures on the spot market. Sec-
tion IV summarizes the principal findings, which
support the position that futures trading has had,
if anything, a stabilizing influence on the spot
prices of GNMA certificates.I. Development of the GNMA Futures Market
The GNMA futures market is the result oftwo
separate developments, both dating back to the
late 1960's. The first was the mortgage industry's
attempt to devise a hedging mechanism to pro-
tect itself from unforeseen interest-rate fluctu-
ations. The second was GNMA's introduction of
a new security to attract more investors to the
housing market.
Mortgage hedging6
The possibility of unforeseen price changes
makes holding inventories of any good a risky
business. Since many people are willing to pay a
price to exchange risk for certainty, organized
futures markets exist so that holders of inven-
tories can hedge against the risks of price
changes.! For example, when a warehouse pur-
chases grain, it may simultaneously enter into a
futures contract to lock in the price at which it
can sell that grain at a later date.
Until the 1960's, futures trading in the United
States was concentrated in grains and the soy-
bean complex. But during the next decade, fu-
tures contracts were added in a number of other
"commodities," ranging from plywood to pork
bellies. And just when the exchanges began look-
ing for new markets to enter, real-estate investors
began discussing the feasibility ofa futures mar-
ket to hedge against interest-rate risk.
Actually, economists at a much earlier time
had used the analogy between the markets for fi-
nancial instruments of varying maturities and
the commodity futures markets to explain the
term structure of interest rates.S But now people
were beginning to discuss the practical problems
of setting up an interest-rate futures market.
They were motivated to do so by the sharp rise in
interest rates in 1969, and by the resulting losses
incurred by fixed-income security holders in gen-
eral and by mortgage lenders in particular.
Mortgage bankers and mortgage-originating
savings-and-Ioan associations stand to lose mon-
ey if interest rates rise between the time at which
they commit their funds and the time at which
they sell the mortgages. Their situation is exactly
analogous to that of the grain elevator which
temporarily holds wheat bought from farmers
before selling it to millers. The biggest difference
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between the two groups is that the latter deals in
a homogeneous commodity for which it is easy to
set standards, while the former deals in a "com-
modity" (i.e., mortgages) which varies tremen-
dously in quality and in exactspecifications. This
lack of homogeneity among mortgages was one
ofthe greatest obstacles to the establishment ofa
mortgage-futures market.9
GNMA certificates
At the same time that the real-estate commu-
nity was attempting to find a way to hedge mort-
gage-interest risks, the Government National
Mortgage Association-created by the Housing
Act of 1968 as part of the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development-was attempting to
help the housing market by making mortgages
more attractive to all types of investors. lO Both
groups faced the same key problem: the lack of
homogeneity across mortgages. Many investors,
lacking the necessary ability to gauge the quality
of particular mortgages, tended to avoid the sec-
ondary mortgage market. Individual investors
were further dissuaded by the large volume of
funds which would be '1eeded to purchase a rea-
sonably well-diversified portfolio of mortgages.
As a result, the secondary mortgage market
lacked the depth of, say, the secondary govern-
ment-bond market. During periods ofhigh inter-
est rates, whenever thrift institutions tried to sell
mortgages out oftheir portfolios to offset deposit
outflows, they were forced to accept unfavorable
terms because of the thinness of the secondary
market. In view of this problem of raising funds,
they found it difficult to continue making new
mortgage loans during tight-money periods.
The GNMA modified pass-through certifi-
cates represented a means ofeasing this difficul-
ty.11 Introduced in early 1970, these certificates
enable an individual investor to purchase a share
in a pool of FHA/VA insured mortgages, with
payment ofthe interest and principal guaranteed
by GNMA. The originator of the mortgages-
typicallyamortgagebankerorsavings andloan-
packages them into a pool of at least $1 million
and turns them over to a custodial bank. All of
the mortgages must bear the same face rate of
interest and have roughly the same maturitydate. GNMA may then issue secunties In
amounts as small as $25,000 on the pool.
The coupon rate on the securities is 50 basis
points less than that on the underlying mort-
gages. (Yield quotations on the securities are
based on the assumption of prepayment in the
12th year.) The issuer of the securities receives
44 basis points as a management fee-for col-
lecting the monthly mortgage payments, "pass-
ing-through" the payments to the security
holders, and for dealing with any delinquent
loans or foreclosures. Even if the issuer does not
receive all of the monthly payments due him, he
remains responsible for seeing that the security
holders get their full payments on time. (It is this
feature that gives rise to the name "modified"
pass-through security.) GNMA itselfguarantees
timely payment to the security owners in the
event ofa default by the issuer, for which service
it receives 6 basis points.
GNMA securities therefore have three levels
ofguarantees. The underlying mortgages are all
FHA- or VA-insured. The issuer ofthe securities
guarantees payment of principal and interest
whether or not he receives his payments on time.
And GNMA stands behind his guarantee with
the full faith and credit ofthe U.S. Government.
Thus, GNMA securities allow an investor with
no specialized knowledge of mortgages to par-
ticipate in the secondary mortgage market with
virtually no fear of default risk.
Forwards and futures
The introduction of GNMA certificates not
only helped to broaden the secondary mortgage
market; it also suggested a solution to the prob-
lem faced by those attempting to create a mort-
gage futures market. Rather than deal directly in
mortgages, market participants might trade
GNMA securities ofsome designated denomina-
tion. Indeed, several years before the approval of
organizedfutures trading, the market developed
informalforward trading in GNMA securities. 12
Forward trading and futures trading are not
the same thing, despite a number of similarities.
Whenever two people agree now to the terms ofa
transaction which will take place sometime later,
forward trading can be said to exist. For exam-
ple, when a mortgage banker begins the months-
long process of assembling a pool of mortgages
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for conversion into a GNMA certificate, he
might negotiate with, say a life insurance com-
pany regarding the price at which he will sell that
security at some specified future date. Such for-
ward contracts became increasingly common as
mortgage lenders attempted to hedge against in-
terest-rate risk-but they did not constitute a fu-
tures market.
A forward contract is an agreement between
two individuals, tailored to their particular
needs. A futures contract is a standardized
agreement, traded on an organized exchange, in
which the exchange itself is the opposite party in
every contract. Telser and Higinbotham express
the difference as follows:
"In a forward contract, the actual identity
of the buyer and seller is important. Nei-
ther has recourse in case of dispute to a
third party other than a court of law. The
validity ofthe forward contract depends on
the good faith of the two parties them-
selves. A futures contract has a third party,
the organized exchange or its designated
representative, that guarantees the validity
of the contract and will enforce the
terms."13
With contracts standardized and with the en-
tire exchange standing behind each agreement,
futures contracts are much more liquid instru-
ments than forward contracts. As a result, the
transactions costs involved in divesting oneselfof
a futures contract are generally less than for a
forward contract. The greater expense of finding
a buyer for an individually-tailored forward con-
tract tends to limit the sale of such contracts to
individuals who actually plan to take physical
possession of the underlying commodity. But fu-
tures-market participants also include a large
number of speculators who are willing to incur
the price risks of buying and selling futures con-
tracts but who never want to take or to make de-
livery. Because of the presence of these
speculators, futures markets have a greater
breadth than forward markets, with consequent
expanded possibilities for hedging.
Nonetheless, futures markets often evolve out
of forward markets. In the case ofGNMA secu-
rities, this evolutionary process was aided by the
passage of the Commodity Futures TradingCommission Act of 1975, which provided the le-
gal basis for the establishment of a formal inter-
est-rate futures market. In October of that year,
trading in GNMA futures contracts began on
the Chicago Board of Trade.
Each contract confers the right to buy or sell a
GNMA certificate with $100,000 in principal
balance and an 8-percent coupon at some speci-
fied future date. (Actual delivery may be made
using certificates with another coupon rate, in
which case the principal balance is adjusted ac-
cordingly.) It is currently possible to enter into
contracts up to almost three years into the future.
Trading in GNMA futures has grown very rap-
idly. In 1977, over 422,000 contracts changed
hands, compared to less than 129,000 during
1976, the first full year of trading. Open interest
in GNMA futures (the number ofcontracts out-
standing) rose to almost 21,000 by the end of
1977, over four times the level ofa year earlier. 14
But the futures market, not surprisingly, has by
no means replaced the forward market. The two
markets typically coexist during the early stages
of development of a futures market, and they
may coexist indefinitely.
A number of recent articles have described
how the GNMA futures contract may be used
for hedging. 15 The question here, however, is not
the usefulness of GNMA futures to individual
hedgers, but rather the impact-if any-of fu-
tures trading on the spot market. Has the futures
market been "too successful" in attracting specu-
lators, so that they, rather than hedgers, domi-
nate the setting of futures prices? To determine
how much truth there is in that popular fear, let
us take a look, first, at the economic theory of
speculation, and second, at the empirical evi-
dence in the case of GNMA futures.
II. The Economics of Speculation
Basically, although speculation usually occurs
in markets characterized by a relatively large
amount ofprice variability, it is the result not the
cause of that variability. This view was succinct-
ly expressed by John Stuart Mill over a century
ago:
"These dealers [speculators] naturally
buying things when they are cheapest, and
storing them up to be brought again into
the market when the price has become un-
usually high; the tendency ofthis operation
is to equalize price, or at least to moderate
its inequalities... Speculators, therefore,
have a highly useful office in the economy
of society; and (contrary to common opin-
ion) the most useful portion ofthe class are
those who speculate in commodities affect-
ed by the vissicitudes of the seasons."16
Speculation, of course, can occur apart from
the existence of futures markets. In the above
quote, Mill described the behavior ofspeculators
whodeal only in the spot market. But as we noted
earlier, organized futures trading tends to en-
courage speculation. Speculation in futures mar-
kets can be carried out without any need to
handle the commodities involved. Moreover,
transactions costs in futures markets are very
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low, and capital requirements aresmall-at least
compared with the costs of actually purchasing
goods on the spot market and holding them in in-
ventory.
Consequently, if speculation is socially benefi-
cial, and if futures markets lead to more specula-
tion than would otherwise occur, we may
conclude that futures markets are useful to soci-
ety as a whole, over and above their benefits to
individual hedgers. Furthermore, their existence
may help to reduce price fluctuations in ways
other than those described by Mill. They may do
so by improving inventory and production deci-
sions-specifically, by providing information on
the likely course of prices in months to come. 17
Holbrook Working has gone so far as to say that,
"Today, the fact that futures trading provides
central market prices established in open com-
petitive bargaining may deserve to be regarded
as the chief merit of futures markets from the
standpoint." 18
what if speculators forecast badly? Might
they not then affect prices perversely, increasing
their variability and reducing their usefulness as
a source of information to direct the allocation of
resources? Milton Friedman, in an often-quoted
passage dealing with foreign-exchange specula-tion but applicable to any commodity, argued
that any such tendencies could not persist for
long:
"People who argue that speculation is gen-
erally destabilizing seldom realize that this
is largely equivalent to saying that specula-
tors lose money, since speculation can be
destabilizing in general only if speculators
on the average sell when the currency is low
and buy when it is high."19
Presumably, such speculators would be speedily
eliminated from the market, leaving only those
with superior foresight.
However, Friedman was careful to add a quali-
fication, which is less often quoted: "A warning is
perhaps in order that this is a simplified general-
ization on a complex problem."20 Friedman him-
selfconceded the possibility, earlier suggested by
Kaldor, that destabilizing speculation might per-
sist if a small body of professional speculators
made money while a continually changing group
of amateurs regularly lost larger sums. The suc-
cessful speculators would still be the ones with
superior foresight, but they would use their fore-
casting skills to predict the psychology of other
speculators. As Kaldor argued:
"In such circumstances, even ifspeculation
as a whole is attended by a net loss, rather
than a net gain, this will not prove, even in
the long run, self-corrective. For the losses
of a floating population of unsuccessful
speculators will be sufficient to maintain
permanently a small body of successful
speculators; and the existence of this body
ofsuccessful speculators will be a sufficient
attraction to secure a permanent supply of
this floating population."21
In Kaldor's scenario, it is profitable for profes-
sional speculators to act in a destabilizing man-
ner-buying even when they consider prices to
be too high in terms of non-speculative underly-
ing trends-as long as they believe that they will
be able to sell at even higher prices to other spec-
ulators. When the psychology of the market
changes, the hapless amateurs are left with the
goods, which they must sell at a loss. These un-
successful speculators are then eliminated from
the market, but a fresh group is always available
to support the next speculative boom.
Other economists have also attempted to argue
that destabilizing speculation can be profitable.22
But the possibility described by Kaldor, in which
speculators devote their efforts to outwitting
each other, probably best accords with the popu-
lar suspicions about futures markets. These sus-
picions are buttressed by what Abba Lerner
refers to as "... the hostility which people who
have to work hard for their living often develop
against the mysterious gains that speculators
make in offices while dealing in goods which they
would not even recognize."23 Let us consider
whether, in the specific case of GNMA futures,
there is any factual basis for this anti-speculative
attitude.
III. Empirical Evidence
Statistical tests for the effects of GNMA fu-
tures trading on GNMA spot prices face a fun-
damental limitation. We may be able to
determine whether the behavior of spot prices
has been different (in some suitably-defined
way) since the start of futures trading, but we
may never be able to ascribe such differences
definitely to the existence of a futures mar
They may merely reflect any of a numbe
changes which have occurred in the economy
since futures trading began.
This problem is, of course, common to many
economic studies, but it is particularly trouble-
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some in the present context. Since October 20,
1975-the beginning of GNMA futures trad-
ing-the course of the U.S. economy in general
and of financial markets in particular has
changed considerably from what went before.
But in addition, the GNMA pass-through is it-
selfa relatively new financial instrument, so that
the development of the GNMA futures market
has coincided with the maturationofthe GNMA
spot market. As a result, any claims that changes
in the spot market were caused by the establish-
ment of a futures market would have to be ac-
companied by even more than the usual
qualifications.Graphic analysis
With those warnings in mind, let us analyze the
actual behavior ofspot GNMA prices during the
periods before and after futures trading began.
(Chart I. Incidentally, the months immediately
surrounding the start of futures trading have
been omitted to remove any transitory distur-
bances associated with the opening of the new
market.) Clearly, the average level of GNM.A.
prices has been higher, and the variability about
that average has been lower, since futures trad-
ing began. But it would surely be wrong to attri-
bute those spot-market changes primarily to the
futures market.
The broad movements in the level ofspot prices
are more reasonably explained as the normal
market response to changes in the prices of long-
term debt instruments which substitute for
GNMA's in investor portfolios. Indeed, recent
prices of GNMA's have roughly paralleled the
prices of long-term government bonds. However,
while it would be wrong to attribute the reduced
variability in the level of GNMA spot prices to
futures trading, it would similarly be unfair to
blame futures trading for the wider swings in
spot prices which would undoubtedly accompany
another period of widespread greater variability
in bond prices. The effects of futures trading-
for good or ill-must be sought elsewhere.
One likely place to look would be the behavior
of the changes in spot prices. Thus, while the
overall trend in spot GNMA prices will be domi-
nated by the overall movements in bond prices,
futures trading might reduce the short-run vari-
ability in spot prices about that trend. Itcould do
this by providing market participants with more
information, in the form of instantly available
price quotations on futures contracts, deter-
mined through competitive bidding in a central-
ized market. Armed with this additional
information, investors in the spot market should
be able to move prices more rapidly to their equi-
librium values, thereby reducing the purely ran-
dom movement in those prices.
An examination of the first differences in the
weekly GNMA price series appears to bear out
this hypothesis (Chart 2). The variability of the
differences has declined markedly since the com-
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25mencementoffutures trading, especially when
the sharp price movements of January 1977 are
excluded. The graphical evidence, then, suggests
that futures trading inGNMA's may have re-
duced the random variability in spot prices. But
before drawing this conclusion, we should test
statistically to determine whether the reduction
in·. the week-to-week movements inGNMA
prices again merely parallels a more<general
market trend.
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(Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. None of the constant terms were significant, and were therefore not reported.)
Regression results
Our test involves regressing the weekly per-
centage changes in spot GNMA prices on the
weekly percentage changes in the prices of ten-
year U.S. Government bonds, which serve as a
proxy for "the bond market." (The ten-year ma-
turity was chosen because it approximates that of
GNMA certificates, which are usually assumed
to have an average life of 12 years.)24 The coeffi-
Chart 2
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26cient of the latter variable provides a measure of
the variability of GNMA prices relative to the
variability ofbond prices generally. Ifthe coeffi-
cient rises significantly after the beginning offu-
tures trading, one could argue that futures
trading tends to destabilize spot prices, increas-
ing their relative variability and hence making
GNMA's a riskier asset.25
The coefficient on the market index appears
roughly constant in both the period before and
the period after the beginning offutures trading.
The standard F-test for the equality of coefi-
cients confirms this impression (at the five-per-
cent level of significance).26 Therefore, the
evidence in Table I suggests that futures trading
has not made GNMA's more risky.
The standard error ofthe regression was much
smaller in the second sub-period than in the first.
Again, this impression is supported by the appro-
priate F-test, which indicates that (at the one-
percent level) the standard error is significantly
less in the later period.27 Since a greater propor-
tion of the week-to-week variance in GNMA
prices can be explained by the movement ofother
bond-market prices following the start offutures
trading, it appears that the GNMA market has
become more integrated over time with the rest
of the capital market.
ofthe random movements around the systematic
trend. The time-series approach seeks to explain
the systematic component ofGNMA prices sole-
ly in terms of the past history of those prices.
An analysis of the autocorrelation structure of
GNMA spot prices suggests that the series could
be adequately represented as a second-order au-
toregressive process, i.e., current prices can be
explained by the prices of last week-GNMA
(-I)-and the week before-GNMA (-2)-
plus a constant term (Table 2).
As in Table I, F-tests indicate no statistically
significant difference (at the five-percent level)
between the coefficients in the two sub-periods,
but they indicate a sigificantly smaller standard
error of the regression in the second period (at
the one-percent level).29 We can thus infer that
the systematic movements ofGNMA prices have
followed the same pattern in the period after as
in the period before futures trading-as evi-
denced by the unchanged coefficients-but that
the random fluctuations in spot prices have been
reduced significantly.
In a final test, we regress the percentage week-
ly change in spot prices on the previous week's
percentagechange (Table 3). In this case, the co-
efficient on the lagged percentage price change is
significant on the first sub-period but not in the
second. In other words, a knowledge of how
GNMA prices moved last week no longer con-
Time-series analysis tains useful information as to how they will move
As a check on these regression results, a Box- this week. All new information affecting GNMA
Jenkins analysis was utilized to measure the im- prices is rapidly incorporated into the current
pact of GNMA futures trading.28 As above, it is market price rather than absorbed by the market
assumed that futures trading has a negligible im- slowly over several weeks. In the language of
pact on the level ofGNMA prices-broad mar- capital-market theory, the GNMA market has
ket forces cause the systematic movements in the become more "efficient" since futures trading
spot price, but futures trading can affect the size began.30
Table 2









































Time Series Analysis of








(Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.)
lagged Percentage Standard












IV. Summary and Conclusions
The empirical results presented in this paper
all suggest that the GNMA spot market has im-
proved its performance in the period since fu-
tures trading began in those securities. The spot
market has become more efficient in processing
new information; it has shown less purely ran-
dom price variability; and it has become more
closely integrated with the rest of the bond mar-
ket. It is impossible to say with certainty how re-
sponsible futures trading has been for any of
these beneficial deveiopments. But it seems clear
that futures trading in GNMA certificates has
not had a destabilizing effect on spot market
prices.
The significance of this conclusion extends be-
yond the GNMA market. Financial futures mar-
kets are still in their infancy. Proposals for still
more ofthem are constantly being made. The re-
sults of this study of GNMA futures suggests
that we have nothing to fear and potentiaiiy
much to gain from the further development of
these markets.
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Although the regressions presented in Table III show that past
movements in GNMA prices formerly contained information use-
ful for predicting future movements in those prices, it is not nec-
essarily the case that profitable arbitrage possibilities existed
during the first sub-period. Transactions costs may have been
too high for investors to exploit the predictive content of past
price movements. The futures market, by reducing the costs of
taking a short position, may have allowed investors to exploit
the information in past prices. This interpretation of the results in
Table 3 was suggested by Kurt Dew.
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